Trafficking in humans for sexual exploitation is an economic activity driven by profit motives. Laws regarding commercial sex influence the profitability of trafficking. Using cross country data we show that trafficking of persons for commercial sexual exploitation is least prevalent in countries where prostitution is illegal, most prevalent in countries where prostitution is legalized, and in between in those countries where prostitution is legal but procuring illegal. Case studies of countries that have changed legal framework confirm the direction of causality as well as the causal mechanisms. The results suggest that criminalizing buying and/or selling sex will reduce the amount of trafficking to a country.
Introduction
International human trafficking of women for commercial sexual exploitation (henceforth trafficking) has been identified as a form of modern day slavery and it is a worldwide problem which has grown rapidly in the last decades (Bettio and Nandi forthcoming ; Hodge and Leitz 2007) . Up to 4 000 000 people are estimated to be exploited by human traffickers each year (UNHCR 2006) . According to the European Commission (2009) trafficking in human beings is a serious crime and a gross violation of human rights and to reduce trafficking in human beings is highly prioritized in many countries. Governments throughout the world view human trafficking as a component of organized crime and the average punishment for trafficking of humans is comparable to other types of serious transnational crimes (Morrison 2000) .
People are trafficked for the purpose of sexual or labour exploitation and it is estimated that between 68 ( ILO 2005, not hinges on the characteristics of the national market for commercial sex. A crucial factor for the profitability of commercial sex is the legal framework surrounding it. Aghatise (2004) argues that it is impossible to combat trafficking where prostitution is sanctioned. This is also the position taken by several governments and it has been an explicit motivation for 1 The figures on the share of sexual exploitation should be taken with care though, since sexual exploitation is argued to be more visible than forced labor (UNODC 2009).
criminalization of buying sex in Norway (Ot.prp. nr.48) and Sweden (Proposition 1997/98:55) and the U.S. Government took a strong position against legalized prostitution using this argument (U.S. State Department 2004). Using the fact that national prostitution legislation differs considerably between countries the aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis that harsher legislation on commercial sex reduces the amount of trafficking to that country.
The economics literature on prostitution is still sparse, although it has grown some in recent years (e.g. Cameron et al. 1999; Edlund and Korn 2002; and Albert et al. 2007 ). Available studies have mainly focused on pricing, and more exactly on pricing as a reflection of risk preferences (Cameron and Collins 2003; Rao et al. 2003; Moffat and Peters 2004; Gertler et al. 2005; Levitt and Venkatesh 2007; and Raj and Shah 2008) . Della Giusta (forthcoming) further builds on the prostitution model of Della Giusta et al. (2008) and incorporate the role of stigma and reputation for policy decisions as well. Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2010a) study attitudes toward prostitution in the general population, and also investigate if a recent criminalization of buying sex in Norway changed public attitudes (Jakobsson and Kotsadam 2010b ).
The economics literature on trafficking for sexual exploitation is even sparser. Of the 5117 females in the sample, 89 percent was trafficked for sexual exploitation. The countries of origin of these women were Eastern Europe and ex-Soviet states. Their salary before being trafficked was USD 52 per month, the amount they were being sold for was about USD 4659 per month. 84 percent were recruited via personal contacts, TV and internet advertising accounted for 7 percent, 5 percent were kidnapped and 1 percent sold by their family. Also using the IOM data, Bettio and Nandi (forthcoming) investigate which factors influence the violation of basic rights (physical integrity, to move freely, to have access to medical care, to use condoms, and to exercise choice over sexual services) among trafficked women. They find that working location and country of work are the main determinants of rights enforcement, while individual and family characteristics play a marginal role.
There is one former study trying to evaluate the effect of national prostitution legislation on trafficking (European Parliament 2005) . Studying official victim data from eleven EU countries they argue that leaner prostitution legislation may cause more trafficking victims.
This conclusion is though drawn from a very small sample (the counties where the data is assumed to be most reliable) and from descriptive statistics. Danailova-Trainor and Besler (2006) study what determines trafficking flows. Using country level estimates of trafficking victim data they find that countries that are more open to globalization and countries with more prostitution are more likely to be destination places for trafficking victims.
Using the trafficking database constructed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, and information about national prostitution legislation, we investigate if there is a relation between prostitution legislation and the prevalence of trafficking to a country. In accordance with our theoretical predictions we find that trafficking of women for commercial sexual exploitation is least prevalent in countries where prostitution is illegal, most prevalent in countries where prostitution is legalized, and in between in those countries where prostitution is legal but procuring illegal. We then proceed to investigate two cases of legal change and its effect on trafficking. The hypothesis of reduced trafficking from harsher laws is confirmed as well as the theoretical mechanisms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses human trafficking and prostitution. Section 3 presents the theoretical mechanisms. Section 4 describes the data and descriptive statistics, while Section 5 considers the empirical framework and results.
Section 6 includes the case studies and Section 7 concludes.
Human trafficking for sexual exploitation and prostitution
Up to 4 000 000 people are estimated to be exploited by human traffickers each year has as its major to maximize profits and its success depends on there being exploitable markets (Morrison 2000) . We therefore argue that the decision made by a trafficker depend on the profit potential. The more profit that can be made in a specific country, the higher is the likelihood that a person will be trafficked to that country. As, always, the profit is a function of revenues and costs. The revenues are a function of the price and the quantity sold at that price and should therefore depend positively on the size of the market in and the per capita income in the destination country.
, where is the profit made by the trafficker, p is the price buying sex, and q is the quantity exchanged, c represents the costs. The costs for the trafficker can be divided into costs for entering a country, such as travel and smuggling costs and costs for running the business once in the country, such as costly discretion etc.
We focus on "demand" in destination countries, or expressed another way, inflow of trafficking victims. Important factors for the traffickers' revenues are the purchasing power and the size of the population in countries of destination. Since deception of migrants is common, and since there are fixed costs in establishing migration routes we argue that increased immigration to a country reduces the costs of trafficking. Another important factor determining the costs is how easy it is to set up and run organized criminal activity.
The legal framework surrounding prostitution is crucial since it affects the profit function. It is likely to affect the supply of trafficked women directly by increasing costs of the day to day prostitution since street prostitution is not viable imposing costly discretion. Laws criminalizing prostitution are likely to affect the demand for prostitution as well, especially if buying sex is illegal, which influences the profitability of trafficking. A direct effect would be that people refrain from buying sex since they are afraid of getting caught. There might also be an important indirect effect working through the normative function of the law Jakobsson 2010a, 2010b) . Prostitution laws affect the stigmatization of buying and selling sex which influences the profit function. Della Giusta (forthcoming) and Della Giusta et al. (2008) argue that policies that reduce the stigma associated with supplying sex would increase the marginal net gain of supplying prostitution and the marginal willingness to pay for it would rise. Policies that increase stigmatization of clients are expected to reduce the marginal willingness to pay, the quantity sold, and the equilibrium price. This framework leads us to expect that slacker prostitution laws leads to more trafficking for sexual exploitation. More specifically we expect most trafficking to countries where prostitution is legal and regulated, least in the countries where buying and/or selling sex is illegal, and flows in between in countries where it is legal to buy and sell but illegal to profit as a third party (pimps or brothel owners).
Data and descriptive statistics
Our dependent variable ( The countries are listed in Table A1 in the appendix.
That a broad range of institutions were used as sources improves the data quality. Only relying on official governmental data would possibly mainly reflect differences in law enforcement and quality of official records. This is the main reason for us choosing this data instead of using only official victim data. There are several problems with victim data, the most obvious being that countries with a lot of resources and good legal system may detect a lot of trafficking even though the problem is not as severe as in other countries. For criminal data to be existent there must be a law, the law enforcement must care enough to act on the problem and be capable of doing so, there must then also be a system of data collection, and a willingness to provide the data to international organisations. We also argue that our data is better suited for our purposes than data from the Counter-Trafficking Module Database (IOM) which is collected only by one organization only and the IOM data is biased towards flows originating from Eastern Europe since the organization was mainly active in that region during the period of the data collection.
We do not entirely overcome the bias existing in official data but it is somewhat alleviated by relying on several sources. Furthermore, by controlling for rule of law, GDP, and drug trafficking (for which data is more reliable) we are confident in that we capture the main Our independent variable of main interest is Law which measures the degree of slackness in the prostitution legislation. It is a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 3. The classification is done according to the well known prostitution policy regimes outlined above but we group neo-abolitionist countries together with prohibitionist countries. Countries where buying and/or selling sex is illegal are coded as 1. Countries where it is legal to buy and sell sex but where procuring (e.g. pimping and running a brothel) is illegal are coded as 2.
Countries where it is legal to buy and sell sex, as well as pimping and owning a brothel are coded as 3. We have legal data on 46 European countries, in 18 of these it is illegal with prostitution, in 20 prostitution is legal but procuring is illegal, and in 8 both prostitution and procuring is legal. In Table A1 in Appendix 1 these countries are listed. The categorization was constructed using the 2003 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. The countries are listed in Table A2 in the appendix.
To take into account that laws are followed to different degrees in different states and to control for how easy it is to be engaged in organized crime we include rule of law and heroin In line with our hypothesis the descriptive statistics clearly show that countries with harsher prostitution laws are less subjected to trafficking. In Table 3 each of the 39 countries are listed according to the combinations of legal regulation of prostitution and prevalence of trafficking. Among the 13 countries where prostitution is illegal, only 1 score High on trafficking prevalence (Bosnia and Herzegovina), and no country in this group score Very high. In the group of 18 countries where prostitution is legal but procuring is illegal, 7 countries score High and 2 countries score Very high. Where both prostitution and procuring is legal (7 countries) 2 score High and 4 score Very high on trafficking prevalence. Although this give indicative evidence that supports the hypothesis the rest of this section is devoted to results from ordered logit regressions.
( Table 3 about here)
Empirical framework and results
Since our dependent variable is discrete and ordered the estimations are preformed using ordered logit regressions: ε is a normally distributed error term. The probability that country i get ranked as trafficking rank k is the probability that the unobserved prevalence of trafficking fall in between the cut-points µ k-1 and µ k .
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The sign of the coefficients reveal the average direction of change in the value of the outcome caused by a positive change in an independent variable. To be able to say anything about the magnitude of the effects we also present marginal effects on the probabilities of observing different outcomes for the Law variable.
In Table 4 , Column 1, we see that Law is clearly related to Trafficking when we do not control for other factors. 4 The coefficient implies that leaner prostitution legislation implies a higher score on the Trafficking index. Although this is illuminating we include control variables (Column 2) to see if the relation holds also when controlling for other variables that may affect trafficking. Also now the Law variable has a clearly negative relation with Trafficking.
We also note that all the control variables are statistically insignificant. We now turn to the size of the effects. If a country goes from a situation where buying and/or selling sex is illegal to a situation where prostitution is legal and regulated (from 1 to 3 on the Law variable), the probability that it will score High or Very high on the trafficking index increases by 68 percent (58 percent in Specification 2). Thus, the empirical analysis clearly supports our theoretical predictions.
( Table 4 about here)
Turning to the full sample, which is arguably less reliable as discussed in the data section, the results are very similar to the European situation. Table 5 presents the ordered logit coefficients. The coefficient on Law implies that leaner prostitution legislation implies a higher score on the Trafficking index, just as in the European case. If a country goes from a situation where buying and/or selling sex is illegal to a situation where prostitution is legal and regulated (from 1 to 3 on the Law variable), the probability that it will score High or Very high on the trafficking index increases by 28 percent (15 percent in Specification 2). Thus, even though the effects are smaller in the whole sample they are still of large magnitude and in the expected direction.
( Table 6 about here) 4 The significance levels and size of effects are robust to exclusion of Denmark and Sweden who changed their prostitution laws considerably during the investigated period (see Appendix 2).
Case studies
So far we have shown that our theoretical predictions gain strong empirical support in both a European sample and globally. Since the data is cross-sectional, however, we are not able to conclude that changes in laws cause changes in trafficking flows, merely that they are statistically correlated. Unfortunately, there exist no longitudinal data on trafficking flows but in this section we will strengthen the causal claims by looking at two European cases where the prostitution law has been made harsher (Sweden and Norway). Furthermore, Norway and Sweden are two similar countries which had different laws during 10 years. This fact is exploited here as well. If our theoretical predictions are correct, trafficking should be reduced.
In Sweden, it has been illegal to buy sex, but not to sell, since 1999. According to the longitudinal survey data, collected before and after the passage of the Norwegian law, we are also able to show a decrease in the quantity of prostitution in Norway as an effect of the law applying a difference in difference methodology. Hence, the Norwegian case study clearly
indicates that prostitution has diminished in Norway. Thereby the profitability of trafficking to Norway should be reduced.
Discussion and conclusion
Acknowledging that trafficking for sexual exploitation is an economic activity driven by profit motives and that state action and inaction is decisive for structuring profit possibilities we develop theoretical predictions. Most importantly, we propose that slacker prostitution laws make it more profitable to traffic persons to a country and that the amount of trafficking will rise accordingly. Using cross country data we find clear support for our theoretical predictions: trafficking of persons for commercial sexual exploitation is least prevalent in countries where prostitution is illegal, most prevalent in countries where prostitution is legalized, and in between in those countries where prostitution is legal but procuring illegal. We then proceed to look at case studies of countries that have changed prostitution laws in order to establish causality. We look at Sweden and Norway who have introduced harsher laws. As predicted trafficking was reduced in these countries. The case studies also confirm the theoretical causal mechanisms. This suggests that criminalizing buying and/or selling sex will reduce the amount of trafficking to a country.
Another important step would be to investigate the mechanisms in the sending countries of this market which would enlighten the ongoing debate and policy process in the attempts to reduce human trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation. It is likely that factors such as poverty, inequality, and the social and economic marginalization of women play a significant role. That people have to flee, that immigration is not free, and racist politics in building a fortress around Europe probably also facilitate the existence of profiteers from trafficking.
Until these factors are resolved we argue that attacking the market for prostitution is sensible. Even for those favoring the sex-work view the benefits of restricting trafficking probably outweighs the costs they see from limiting "free-choice". Addressing prostitution is much more sensible, we argue, than the attempts to further strengthen immigration which restrict the human right to get shelter. After all, buying sex is not a human right! 0.403** 0.336** 0.495*** -0.073 -0.036 0.247 1.000 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Tables

WDI (2006)
Rule of law Ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better rule of law outcomes, average from 1996-2003.
AGI (2009)
Net migration
The net number of migrants, divided by the average population of the receiving country, year 2000. It is expressed as the net number of migrants per 1000 population.
WDI (2006)
Heroin Number of kilograms heroin seizures on average per year 2000 -2005 . UDOC (2007 
